13. Douglas MacArthur - Farewell to Congress Address
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and Distinguished Members of the Congress:
I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great
pride humility in the wake
of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me. pride in the
reflection that this forum of legislative debate represents human liberty in
the purest form yet devised.
Here are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race. I do
not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach
quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane
of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore,
that you will do me the justice of receiving that
which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.
I address you with
neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one
purpose in mind: to serve my country. The issues are global and so
interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but
to court disaster for the whole.
While Asia is commonly referred to as the Gateway to Europe, it is no less true that
Europe is the Gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail
to have its impact upon the other. There are those who claim our strength
is inadequate to protect on both
fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of
defeatism. If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it
is for us to counter his effort. The Communist threat
is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens
the destruction of every other sector. You can
not appease or otherwise surrender to communism in
Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to
halt its advance in Europe.
Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall
confine my discussion to the general areas
of Asia. Before one may objectively assess the situation now existing there, he must
comprehend something of Asia"s past and the revolutionary changes which
have marked her course up to
the present. Long exploited by the socalled colonial powers, with
little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of
life such as guided our own
noble administration in the Philippines, the peoples of Asia found
their opportunity in the war just past to
throw off the shackles of colonialism and now
see the dawn of new opportunity, a heretofore unfelt dignity, and the selfrespect
of political
freedom.
Mustering half of the earth"s population, and 60
percent of its natural resources these peoples
are rapidly consolidating a new
force, both moral and material, with which
to raise the living
standard and erect adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural
environments. Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the direction
of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It
is a corollary to the shift of the world
economic frontiers as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area
whence it started.
In
this situation, it becomes vital
that our own country orient its policies in consonance with
this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to
the reality that the colonial
era is now past and the Asian peoples covet
the right to shape their own free destiny.
What they seek now
is friendly guidance, understanding, and support
not imperious direction the
dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation. Their prewar
standard of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now
in the devastation left in war"s wake. World
ideologies play little part in Asian
thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive
for is the opportunity for a little more food in
their stomachs, a little better clothing on their
backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist
urge for political freedom. These politicalsocial conditions have but an
indirect bearing upon our
own national security, but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be
thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.
Of more direct and immediately bearing upon our national
security are the changes wrought in
the strategic potential of the Pacific Ocean
in the course of the past war. Prior thereto
the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on
the literal line of the Americas, with an
exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to
the Philippines. That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which
the enemy could and did attack.
The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the
bordering land areas.
All this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then
shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which became a vast moat to
protect us as long as we held it. Indeed,
it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of
the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to
the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an
arc from the Aleutians to the Mariannas held by
us and our free allies. From this island chain
we can dominate with
sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore with
sea and air power every port, as I
said, from Vladivostok to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.
Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort. No amphibious force can be
successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in
its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modest
ground elements to defend bases, any
major attack from continental Asia toward
us or our friends in the Pacific would be doomed to failure.
Under such conditions, the Pacific no
longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a
prospective invader. It assumes, instead, the friendly aspect of a peaceful
lake.
Our line of
defense is a natural one and can be maintained
with a minimum of military effort and
expense. It envisions no attack against anyone,
nor does it provide the bastions essential
for offensive operations, but properly maintained, would be an invincible defense against
aggression. The holding of this literal defense line in
the western Pacific is entirely dependent upon
holding all segments thereof. for any major breach of that line by an
unfriendly power
would render vulnerable to determined attack every other major segment.
This is a military estimate as to which
I have yet to find a military leader who will
take exception. For that reason, I have strongly recommended
in the past, as a matter of military
urgency, that under no
circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. Such an
eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan and
might well force our western frontier back to the coast of California, Oregon and Washington.
To understand the changes which now appear upon the Chinese mainland, one must
understand the changes in Chinese character and culture over the past 50 years. China,
up to 50 years ago, was completely nonhomogenous,
being compartmented into groups divided
against each other. The warmaking tendency was almost nonexistent,
as they still followed
the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. Atthe turn of the century, under the
regime of Chang Tso Lin, efforts toward greater
homogeneity produced the start of a
nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed
under the leadership of
Chiang KaiShek,
but has been brought to
its greatest fruition under the present regime to the
point that it has now
taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly dominant,
aggressive tendencies.
Through these past
50 years the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in
their ideals. They now constitute excellent soldiers, with competent staffs and
commanders. This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia, which, for its own
purposes, is allied with Soviet Russia but which in its own
concepts and methods has become
aggressively imperialistic, with a lust
for expansion and increased power normal to this type of
imperialism.
There is little of the ideological
concept either one way or another in
the Chinese makeup.
The standard of living is so low and the capital accumulation has been
so thoroughly dissipated by war that
the masses are desperate and eager to follow any leadership which
seems to promise the alleviation of local stringencies.
I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese Communists" support of the North
Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are, at present, parallel with
those of the
Soviet. But
I believe that the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea but also in
IndoChina and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the South reflects predominantly the
same lust for the expansion of power which has animated every wouldbe
conqueror since the beginning of time.
The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in
modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to
understand, they have, from the ashes left in war"s wake, erected in Japan an edifice
dedicated to the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity. and in the ensuing
process there has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance
of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice.
Politically, economically, and socially Japan
is now abreast of many free nations of the earth
and will not again fail the universal
trust. That it may be counted upon
to wield a profoundly
beneficial influence over the course of events in
Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in
which the Japanese people have met
the recent challenge of war,
unrest, and confusion
surrounding them from the outside and checked communism within their own frontiers
without the slightest slackening in their forward
progress. I sent all four of our occupation divisions to
the Korean battlefront without the slightest qualms as to the effect of the resulting
power vacuum upon Japan. The results fully justified my faith. I
know of no nation more
serene, orderly, and industrious, nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future
constructive service in the advance of the human race.
Of our former ward, the Philippines, we can
look forward in confidence that
the existing unrest will be corrected and a strong and healthy nation will grow
in the longer aftermath of war"s
terrible destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and never fail
them as in our hour of need,
they did not fail
us. A Christian
nation, the Philippines stand as a mighty
bulwark of Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high
moral leadership in
Asia is unlimited.
On Formosa, the government of the Republic of China has had
the opportunity to refute by
action much of the malicious gossip which so
undermined the strength of its leadership on
the Chinese mainland. The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened administration with
majority representation on
the organs of government, and politically, economically, and
socially they appear to be advancing along sound and constructive lines.
With
this brief insight into the surrounding areas, I
now turn to the Korean conflict. While I
was not consulted prior to the President"s decision to
intervene in support of the Republic of
Korea, that decision
from a military standpoint,
proved a sound one, as we hurled back the
invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within
reach, when Red China intervened with
numerically superior ground forces.
This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation
not contemplated when our
forces were committed against
the North Korean invaders. a situation which called for new
decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit
the realistic adjustment of military strategy.
Such decisions have not been forthcoming.
While no man
in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental
China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic
revision of strategic planning if our political aim
was to defeat this new
enemy as we had
defeated the old.
Apart from the military need, as I saw
It, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the
enemy north of the Yalu, I felt
that
military necessity in
the conduct of the war made
necessary: first
the intensification of our economic blockade against China. two the imposition
of a naval blockade against the China coast. three removal of restrictions on air
reconnaissance of China"s coastal areas and of Manchuria.
four removal of restrictions on the
forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to
contribute to their
effective operations against
the common enemy.
For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to
Korea and bring hostilities to an end with
the least possible delay and at a saving of countless
American and allied lives, I
have been
severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad,
despite my understanding that from a military standpoint
the above views have been fully
shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign,
including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I called for reinforcements but was informed that reinforcements were not available.
I made
clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy builtup
bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to
utilize the friendly Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not
permitted to blockade the China coast
to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from
without, and if there were to be no
hope of major reinforcements, the position of the
command from the military standpoint forbade victory.
We could hold in Korea by constant
maneuver and in an approximate area where our supply
line advantages were in balance with
the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we
could hope at best for only an
indecisive campaign with
its terrible and constant attrition upon
our forces if the enemy utilized its full
military potential. I have constantly called for the new
political decisions essential to a solution.
Efforts have been made
to distort my position. It
has been said, in effect, that I was a
warmonger.
Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men
now living
know it, and nothing to
me is more revolting.
I have long advocated its complete abolition, as
its very destructiveness on both friend and foe
has rendered it useless as a means of settling
international disputes. Indeed, on the second day of September, nineteen
hundred and fortyfive,
just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship Missouri, I formally
cautioned as follows:
"Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through
the ages have been attempted to devise an
international process to prevent or
settle disputes between nations. From the very start workable methods were
found in so
far as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an
instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military
alliances, balances of power, Leagues of Nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only
path to
be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now
blocks out this alternative. We have had our last
chance. If we will not devise
some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The
problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and
improvement of human character that will
synchronize with our almost matchless
advances in science, art, literature, and all
material and cultural developments of
the past 2000 years. It
must be of the spirit
if we are to save the flesh."
But once war is forced upon
us, there is no other alternative than
to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.
War"s very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there is no substitute for victory.
There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to
history"s clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but
begets new and bloodier war. It points to no
single instance where this end has justified that
means, where appeasement
has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the
basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the
only other alternative.
"Why," my soldiers asked of me, "surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field?"
I could not answer.
Some may say: to avoid spread of the conflict into an allout
war with China. others, to avoid Soviet
intervention. Neither explanation
seems valid, for China is already engaging with the
maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh
its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that
the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a worldwide
basis.
The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact
that its military action is confined to its
territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which
it is our purpose to save, to suffer the
devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy"s sanctuaries are fully
protected from such attack and devastation.
Of the nations of the world, Korea alone,
up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all
against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people
defies description.
They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to
me were: "Don"t
scuttle the Pacific!"
I have just left your fighting sons in Korea.
They have met all tests there, and I can report to
you without reservation
that they are splendid in every way.
It was my constant effort
to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with
the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me
the deepest anguish and anxiety.
Those gallant men will remain often
in my thoughts and in
my prayers always.
I am closing my 52 years of military service. When
I joined the Army, even before the turn of
the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish
hopes and dreams. The world has turned
over many times since I
took the oath on the plain
at West Point, and the hopes and dreams
have long since vanished, but I
still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack
ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that "old soldiers never die. they just fade
away."
And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now
close my military career and just fade away, an
old soldier who tried to do
his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.
Good Bye.
